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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IT ALL:
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
OBLIGATIONS IN
MATRIXX INITIATIVES, INC. V.
SIRACUSANO
SIOBHAN INNES-GAWN

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Physicians or consumers of pharmaceutical products can file
complaints with the manufacturing company or with the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to report adverse events that occurred
after use. When the FDA receives the complaint, the agency may
1
decide that an investigation into the drug’s safety is warranted.
Announcements of FDA investigations into drug safety may result in
2
a drop in the manufacturing company’s stock price. Prior to 2006,
when consumers complained directly to the company, homeopathic
drug companies were not required to report these complaints to the
3
4
FDA. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano addresses whether a drug
company violated securities-law disclosure requirements by failing to
disclose these complaints to its shareholders. Section 10(b) of the
5
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities Exchange

*

2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Brief for Petitioners at 22–23, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S.
Aug. 20, 2010).
2. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18,
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2010) (“Such regulatory
attention can have a significant impact on a drug’s commercial success and litigation risk.”).
3. Brief for Respondents at 9, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S.
Nov. 5, 2010). In 2006, Congress enacted a statute requiring the manufacturers of homeopathic
drugs to report serious adverse events to the FDA. The Dietary Supplement and
Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §379aa (West 2011).
4. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2010).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2011).
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6

Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 require corporations to disclose
material information to their shareholders. Matrixx Initiatives
concerns whether adverse-event reports are material information
under this rule when the reports do not demonstrate a statistically
7
significant link between drug use and adverse events.
II. FACTS
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx) is a pharmaceutical company
whose wholly-owned subsidiary, Zicam, LLC, produces and markets a
8
homeopathic cold remedy called Zicam Cold Remedy (Zicam).
Zicam can be administered intranasally through a spray or gel, and its
9
active ingredient is zinc gluconate. Prior to placing the drug on the
market, Matrixx had conducted two clinical trials of Zicam with no
10
indication of any statistically significant safety issues. In 1999, a
doctor reported to Matrixx that his patient had developed anosmia,
11
the loss of smell, after using Zicam intranasally. The doctor also
informed Matrixx that studies had shown that the intranasal
application of zinc compounds can produce anosmia and offered to
12
study a possible link between Zicam and anosmia. In 2002, Matrixx’s
Vice President of Research and Development, Timothy Clarot
(Clarot), contacted a scientist whose patient had complained to

6. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).
7. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at i.
8. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx I), No. CV 04 0886 PHX MHM, 2005
WL 3970117, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005), rev’d, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010).
9. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (Matrixx II), 585 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2009).
10. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 5. While homeopathic drugs must meet strength,
quality, and purity standards, the FDA does not subject them to the rigorous safety and efficacy
requirements that other medicinal drugs must meet. Conditions Under Which Homeopathic
Drugs May Be Marketed, FDA Compliance Policy Guide § 400.400 (1995), http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm074360.htm. Statistical
signficance can be summarized as follows:

To assess statistical significance in the medical context, a
researcher begins with the ‘null hypothesis,’ i.e., that there is no
relationship between the drug and the adverse effect. The
researcher calculates a ‘p-value,’ which is the probability that the
association observed in the study would have occurred even if
there were in fact no link between the drug and the adverse
effect. If that p-value is lower than the ‘significance level’ selected
for the study, then the results can be deemed statistically
significant.

Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 13.
11. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170.
12. Id.
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Matrixx of anosmia after using Zicam. The scientist subsequently
sent Clarot information about polio studies from the 1930s linking
14
zinc sulfate to anosmia. Clarot asked the scientist if she would
15
participate in animal studies of Zicam, but she declined. In 2003, Dr.
Bruce Jafek prepared a presentation to the American Rhinologic
Society studying ten patients who took Zicam prior to losing their
16
sense of smell. Matrixx informed Dr. Jafek that he could not use the
17
names “Matrixx” or “Zicam” in his presentation and asked for more
18
information about the possible link.
Despite receiving notifications of a potential link between using
Zicam and developing anosmia, Matrixx “continued to make positive
statements regarding Matrixx’s growth and revenue and Zicam’s
19
safety” without disclosing the possible link to shareholders. In its
press releases and an earnings conference call, Matrixx touted
20
Zicam’s potential for growth and efficacy. In a filing with the SEC,
Matrixx warned of the risk and consequences of possible productliability litigation, but did not disclose that a lawsuit had been filed
21
already alleging that Zicam caused loss of smell.
On January 30, 2004, a news article reported that three lawsuits
had been filed against Matrixx and that the FDA was investigating a
22
possible link between Zicam and anosmia. Over the next two days,
23
Matrixx’s stock price fell from $13.55 to $11.97. Matrixx responded
by issuing a press release declaring that “statements alleging that
intranasal Zicam products cause anosmia (loss of smell) are
24
completely unfounded and misleading.” The company also stated
that the drug’s safety and efficacy had been established in two clinical

13. Id.
14. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 6.
15. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170.
16. Id. at 1171.
17. Id. While the Ninth Circuit appeared to believe that Matrixx’s refusal to grant
permission for Jafek to use the name “Zicam” in his presentation lends support to Matrixx’s
having the requisite scienter under Rule 10b-5, id. at 1182, Matrixx’s refusal might have been
merely a strategic precaution protecting its trademark from possible bad publicity or slander.
18. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 7.
19. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx I), No. CV 04 0886 PHX MHM, 2005
WL 3970117, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005), rev’d, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010).
20. Id.
21. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1172.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1173 (quoting Press Release, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2004)).
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trials. The next day, Matrixx’s stock price rose to $13.40. On
February 6, Good Morning America reported on the possible link
between Zicam and anosmia, and the stock price fell even more
27
dramatically—from $13.05 on February 5 to $9.94 on February 6.
Matrixx again denied the allegations that Zicam caused anosmia in a
press release, reiterating that the drug had been tested in two clinical
28
trials without any reports of anosmia. In another SEC filing a few
weeks later, however, Matrixx stated that a panel of scientists had
concluded that “‘insufficient scientific evidence [was available] at this
time to determine if zinc gluconate, when used as recommended,
29
affects a person’s ability to smell.’”
In April 2004, Siracusano brought a class action suit against
Matrixx under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
30
(PSLRA). The PSLRA permits private individuals to sue on behalf
of all who invested in a particular company during a stated period of
31
time to enforce federal securities laws. Siracusano sued on behalf of
all investors in Matrixx between October 22, 2003, and February 6,
32
2004 (the Class Period). Siracusano alleged that Matrixx violated
Rule 10b-5 by not disclosing the risk that Zicam causes anosmia and
33
by issuing false and misleading statements. The district court granted
34
Matrixx’s motion to dismiss and Siracusano appealed. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, holding that materiality
under Rule 10b-5 does not require statistical significance, and thus
35
Siracusano had “sufficiently pled materiality to survive dismissal.” In
June 2009, several years after this litigation began and after the Class
Period, the FDA issued a warning letter to Matrixx stating that Zicam
36
might pose a safety risk to consumers.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Form 8-K Filing, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Feb. 19, 2004)).
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77–78 (West 2010).
Id.
Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170.
Id.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1169 n.1.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implements
37
a “‘philosophy of full disclosure’” and authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission to promulgate rules prohibiting “manipulative
or deceptive” practices “in connection with the purchase or sale of
38
any security.” Under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful to “make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
39
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” To
prove a violation, a plaintiff must show “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss
40
causation, and (5) economic loss.” As the district court dismissed the
case based on Siracusano’s failure to allege sufficient materiality and
41
scienter, only these elements are at issue in this case. Under the
PSLRA, Congress codified a private right of action for violations of
Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) and established heightened
42
pleading requirements. The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to identify
and explain each misleading statement and allege facts “giving rise to
43
a strong inference” of scienter.
A. Materiality
44

In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court
clarified the standard for determining whether an omission of fact is
45
material in federal securities law cases. TSC Industries concerned
Securities Exchange Act section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9, which
46
prohibit the omission of material facts in proxy statements. In TSC
Industries, the Court balanced the purpose of the proxy regulations—
to encourage corporate management to disclose pertinent

37. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)).
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2011).
39. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).
40. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005).
41. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1177.
42. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320–21 (2007); Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77–78 (West 2010).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West 2010).
44. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
45. Id. at 443.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011).
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information to keep shareholders informed in their investment
47
decisions —against the concern that disclosures could hurt, rather
48
than help, shareholders in some situations. For example, in its
attempt to reduce potential liability, management might over-disclose
and “bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a
49
result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.” The
Court thus held that the appropriate standard of materiality requires
“a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
50
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”
The Supreme Court applied the materiality standard set out in
TSC Industries to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Basic Inc. v.
51
Levinson. Basic Inc. addressed whether a preliminary merger
52
discussion was material under Rule 10b-5. In that case, Basic Inc., a
publicly traded company, had publicly denied its involvement in
merger negotiations even though its officers and directors met with
53
another company about a possible merger during that time. After
the merger was approved, former shareholders who sold their shares
after Basic’s denials sued the company alleging that its statements
54
violated Rule 10b-5.
The Basic Court expressly adopted the TSC Industries test for
55
determining materiality under Rule 10b-5. The Court settled on this
“highly fact-dependent probability/magnitude” test as the correct
approach to determining the materiality of “contingent or speculative
56
information or events,” such as merger negotiations. Emphasizing
that the significance of the information is necessary to a finding of
materiality, the Court noted that it is insufficient to find merely that
57
the information was false or incomplete. In rejecting a bright-line
rule, the Court emphasized that materiality requires “an inherently
fact-specific finding” and that although such a rule might be easy to

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 448–49.
Id.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 232–33, 237.
Id. at 238, 239 n.16.
Id. at 238.
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58

apply, it is always over or underinclusive. The Court reiterated that
materiality requires an assessment of the facts and rejected “confining
59
[it] to a rigid formula.”
B. Scienter
The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead facts that give rise to a
“strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
60
61
mind.” In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of “strong inference” in response to a
62
split among the circuit courts. The Tellabs Court held that when
determining whether allegations provide a strong inference, courts
must view them as a whole and “consider plausible nonculpable
63
explanations” as well. Most importantly, the Court held that a
complaint will allege sufficient scienter only where the facts give rise
to an inference of scienter as “cogent and at least as compelling as any
64
opposing inference.”
IV. HOLDING
In Matrixx Initiatives, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
erred in relying on a statistical significance standard to reject, as a
matter of law, Siracusano’s allegations of materiality and scienter
65
under Rule 10b-5. It concluded that requiring a standard of
statistical significance in the materiality determination would
66
contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic. The Basic Court
stated that assessing materiality involves a “fact-specific inquiry” and
rejected the application of a “bright-line rule” to materiality
67
determinations. As a result, the Ninth Circuit determined that
dismissing a case based solely on the failure of the plaintiff to plead
statistical significance would cut against Basic by both enforcing a
bright-line rule and violating the principle that the trier of fact should

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 233, 236.
Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 2010).
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324.
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (Matrixx II), 585 F.3d 1167, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
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68

assess materiality. The Ninth Circuit held that there is no statistical
significance requirement to state a claim of material omission, and
thus Siracusano’s failure to allege statistical significance would not
bar a trier of fact from finding that Matrixx’s omissions were
69
material.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit conducted a fact-specific inquiry to
decide whether a reasonable investor would have considered
information about the possible link between Zicam and anosmia
70
significant. In making this determination, the court considered that
physicians reported the user complaints, that Matrixx knew of studies
demonstrating a link between intranasal application of zinc
compounds and development of anosmia, that Matrixx was aware of
case studies indicating that patients developed anosmia after using
Zicam, and that lawsuits against Matrixx alleging that Zicam causes
71
anosmia were pending. In light of these facts, the court held that
Siracusano adequately alleged that Matrixx’s nondisclosure of
72
adverse-event reports was material.
The Ninth Circuit also held that the facts pled in the complaint
enabled a reasonable person to infer that Matrixx had the requisite
73
scienter. Despite no indication that the adverse-event reports were
statistically significant, the court determined that “the inference of
scienter is ‘cogent and at least as compelling’ as any ‘plausible non74
culpable explanation[]’ for [Matrixx’s] conduct.”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Matrixx’s (Petitioner’s) Argument
Matrixx argues that the adverse-event reports it received are not
material and that no strong inference of deceit can be made because
Siracusano’s complaint does not assert that these reports are
statistically significant. Without statistical significance, nothing

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1183.
Id. at 1179–80.
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id. at 1179–80.
Id. at 1183.
Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)).
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indicates a causal relationship, and thus Siracusano failed to
75
sufficiently allege materiality and scienter.
First, Matrixx claims that the complaints it received and failed to
disclose during the Class Period are not material within the meaning
76
of SEC Rule 10b-5. In effect, Matrixx argues that no reasonable
investor would consider adverse-event reports to “‘significantly alter[]
the total mix of information’” available, unless they indicate that the
drug users’ incidence of adverse events is statistically significant as
77
compared to non-drug users’ incidence of adverse events. As
adverse-event reports include “any anecdotal report that the user of a
drug experienced an adverse event at some point during or following
the use of that drug” and they are “inherently unreliable,” such
reports do not show a causal relationship between drug use and the
78
adverse event. Additionally, people with the common cold, Zicam’s
target population, are more likely to develop anosmia in the first
79
place. This increased incidence suggests that even if Zicam users’
rate of adverse events is higher than that of the general population,
80
this could be due to preexisting illness.
Matrixx argues that compelling the disclosure of adverse-event
reports, absent some statistically significant evidence of a causal
relationship, would “inundate[e] the market with useless, trivial, and
even affirmatively misleading information, which will only undermine
81
reasoned investment decisionmaking.” Since the reports provide
only unreliable and speculative information, reasonable investors
82
would not use them to make investment decisions. Furthermore, to
avoid potential liability for securities fraud, pharmaceutical
83
companies will react by disclosing all adverse-event reports. This will
force investors to sift through unnecessary and unreliable information
when making their investment decisions without providing any
reasonable way for them to determine when products face legitimate
84
safety concerns. By inundating consumers with adverse-event

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 26 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988)).
Id. at 17, 20.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
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reports—thus hiding truly important information in a sea of
insignificant and trivial information—this type of compelled
disclosure would undermine the purpose of the materiality
85
requirement.
Second, Matrixx maintains that investors care about the existence
of a causal relationship between drug use and adverse-health events,
which are not speculative and are unreliable allegations of a link.
Statistically significant evidence of causation must be required before
86
a company discloses adverse-event reports. Scientists use statistical
significance to measure the degree of association between two events,
or put differently, whether two events “‘occur together more
87
frequently than one would expect by chance.’” Courts also use
statistical significance in some legal contexts, such as product liability
88
and toxic torts, to provide evidence of causation. Because statistical
significance distinguishes between the random coincidence of two
events and a nonrandom association between those events, this
standard “defines” what information is relevant to a reasonable
89
investor.
According to Matrixx, relying on a statistical significance standard
for materiality would provide guidance both for investors in making
investment decisions related to product-safety risks, and for
90
companies about what information they are obligated to disclose.
Other than this standard, “there is no intelligible basis” for
understanding when the drug, and not other factors, causes adverse
91
events. To sufficiently plead the materiality of omitted facts, a
plaintiff should be required to allege facts demonstrating a
statistically significant increase in the incidence of adverse events
reported by drug users over the incidence of adverse events in the
92
population suffering from the target condition. The complaint should
fail as a matter of law because Siracusano did not allege that
consumer complaints showed a statistically significant increase

85. Id.
86. Id. at 32–33.
87. Id. at 34 (quoting Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 354–58 (2d ed.
2000)).
88. Id. at 36–37.
89. Id. at 43.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Id. at 49.
92. Id. at 42.
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between the rate of anosmia among the general population or cold93
sufferers and the rate among Zicam users.
In addition to failing to adequately allege materiality, Matrixx
94
argues that Siracusano did not sufficiently plead scienter. The
complaint does not plead facts that give rise to a strong inference of
an intention to deceive, that is, an inference that is “‘cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
95
the facts alleged.’” First, because adverse-event reports generally are
unreliable and provide speculative information, one cannot infer that
Matrixx believed this information was material and warranted
96
disclosure. Second, because the adverse-event reports received by
Matrixx do not show a statistically significant increase in anosmia
among Zicam users compared to cold-sufferers in general, an
inference that Matrixx had the requisite scienter is not as compelling
97
as other inferences. In fact, the “most obvious inference” is that
Matrixx did not disclose the adverse-event reports because it did not
believe they “indicate[d] anything meaningful about adverse reactions
98
to [the] use of Zicam.” Therefore, Siracusano’s complaint failed to
99
sufficiently allege the presence of scienter.
B. Siracusano’s (Respondent’s) Arguments and Supporting Arguments
by the United States as Amicus Curiae
Siracusano argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that statistical significance is not required to
allege the materiality of omitted adverse-event reports. A finding of
100
materiality in securities-fraud cases requires a factual inquiry.
Requiring a statistical significance standard would impose the type of
101
bright-line rule that the Supreme Court rejected in Basic.
Additionally, the facts demonstrate that Matrixx acted with
intentional deceit or recklessness by failing to disclose consumer
102
complaints and by making statements about the safety of Zicam.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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First, because the standard for materiality requires determining
whether the reasonable investor would consider the omitted facts to
103
“significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information made available,”
104
Siracusano emphasizes the necessity of a factual inquiry.
Considering this fact-specific determination, materiality should be
decided on the evidence, not at the pleading stage, and therefore the
105
case should proceed to trial. The facts show that causation between
Zicam use and anosmia is more than plausible—doctors (not merely
consumers alone) have pinpointed a possible connection, patients felt
a burning feeling after using Zicam, and studies have shown that
106
another zinc compound causes anosmia. Matrixx had knowledge of
these facts prior to the commencement of the Class Period and thus
withheld information that a reasonable investor would find
107
significant. Additionally, Matrixx misled the public about the extent
of scientific study on whether Zicam use causes anosmia by making
108
affirmative statements that it was safe.
Second, Siracusano argues that requiring statistical significance to
prove materiality would depart from Supreme Court precedent,
creating an underinclusive materiality determination that leaves out
numerous considerations that a reasonable investor would deem
109
important. Statistical significance is a poor indicator of the practical
importance of information to a reasonable investor because it is not
error free and does not “incorporate either the magnitude or the
110
implications of a study’s result.” The statistical significance standard
is analogous to the bright-line rule rejected in Basic in that a
categorical rule of statistical significance would allow pharmaceutical
companies to withhold information that reasonable investors would
111
deem significant.
Although courts should consider statistical
significance before trial, that standard should not prevent the parties
from having their day in court because investors consider many
112
factors when making a decision.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 25–26.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 39–41.
Id. at 38–40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 45–47.
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Siracusano argues that, viewing the allegations as a whole, the
113
complaint gives rise to a strong inference of scienter. Considering
Matrixx was “well aware of the potential risk that the doctors’
findings posed to its products” and failed to disclose this information,
an inference that Matrixx intentionally deceived or recklessly
114
withheld information is just as compelling as any other inference.
Additionally, Matrixx’s statements about Zicam’s “well established”
safety and its “reluctant admissions” that there was insufficient
scientific evidence to determine whether Zicam use is linked to
115
anosmia, lead to a compelling inference of scienter.
The United States supports the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
116
Siracusano sufficiently pled materiality and scienter. It reiterates
Siracusano’s position that reasonable investors do not limit
investment decisions only to information showing a statistically
117
significant association between drug use and adverse events. The
government suggests that statistical significance is a limited tool and is
118
only one of many that can be used to determine causation. Investors
should not be restricted to statistically significant information because
information suggesting possible adverse effects can alter investor and
regulatory behavior, which in turn could affect a company’s share
119
price. The United States also argues the statistical significance
standard conflicts with Basic’s emphasis on a factual inquiry and
120
rejection of a bright-line rule, and therefore should not bar a trial.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the statistical significance
standard in determining materiality under Rule 10b-5 created a
circuit split. The Second Circuit first established the statistical
121
significance standard in this context in In re Carter-Wallace. In
holding that a drug company was not obligated to disclose deaths
related to drug use, the Second Circuit stated that adverse-event
reports need not be disclosed until they show statistically significant
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 22–23.
In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998).
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evidence of a nonrandom association and are serious enough to affect
122
the drug’s prospective earnings. The Third Circuit (in an opinion
authored by then-Judge Alito) subsequently adopted this standard in
123
Oran v. Stafford, holding that it was not materially misleading to
withhold data where a causal link had not been conclusively
124
ascertained. Finally, the First Circuit relied on the statistical
significance standard to determine that a drug company lacked the
requisite scienter under Rule 10b-5, assuming that the plaintiffs met
125
the materiality standard. Thus, due to the Ninth Circuit’s departure
from the other circuit courts’ decisions, this issue is ripe for
clarification by the Supreme Court.
Whether materiality under Rule 10b-5 should require a showing
of statistical significance rests primarily on how one views the
corporate disclosure obligations embedded in federal securities laws.
The most apparent difficulty with this case is that each side’s
arguments appear to fulfill the purpose behind these laws and Rule
10b-5 in particular. The standard set forth in TSC Industries states that
an omission or misstatement is material only where a reasonable
investor would deem it to “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of
126
information made available.” While the purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to
encourage the full disclosure of information to shareholders, the
purpose of the materiality requirement is to weed out insignificant
127
and trivial information from a company’s disclosure obligation. The
requirement seeks to encourage companies to be open with their
investors but, at the same time, not flood them with insignificant
information that would make it overly burdensome to determine
128
what information is important. Therefore, there is an inherent
tension. Matrixx and Siracusano represent opposite sides of this
tension. Siracusano wants companies to disclose possibly insignificant
adverse-event reports, whereas Matrixx wants to disclose only
information that demonstrates a statistically significant link. The
Supreme Court must decide, therefore, whether requiring disclosure
of adverse-event reports absent statistical significance ultimately

122.
123.
124.
125.
2008).
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 284.
N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen Idec Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 47 (1st Cir.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Id. at 448–49; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448–49.
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would disrupt the delicate balance between disclosing too little and
disclosing too much information.
One of the issues raised by this case is the application of scientific
phenomena to law. The premise of a statistical significance calculation
is to determine whether two or more events have occurred together
129
by chance or whether that occurrence is unlikely to occur randomly.
Statistical significance alone does not suggest causation—it indicates
130
correlation. But where facts do not rise to the level of statistical
significance, this means a correlative relationship between two events
131
is highly unlikely. Thus, where adverse-event reports are not
statistically significant, there is likely no correlation between drug use
and adverse events—let alone a causal relationship. Theoretically,
information that is not statistically significant would not have any
effect on investment decisions because there is no scientifically
proven basis for concern.
Despite the apparent applicability of statistical significance to
whether adverse-event reports are material to investors and should be
disclosed by pharmaceutical companies, Siracusano argues that the
imposition of such a standard would depart from Supreme Court
precedent. Basic’s rejection of a bright-line rule suggests that a rule
like that proposed by Matrixx would impinge on the factual inquiry
132
that must be conducted in determining materiality. In this inquiry,
one should assess whether a reasonable investor would consider
information important in deciding whether to buy or sell stock.
Requiring a statistical significance standard at the pleading stage
would bar cases from trial unless adverse-event reports were
statistically significant. No other factors relevant to the materiality
inquiry would be considered absent reaching an initial threshold of
statistical significance. These factors might include those ensuring that
safety complaints are legitimate, such as who reported the adverse
event (i.e., a doctor or a patient) and the type and extent of adverse
effects, as well as factors suggesting a causal link. This would keep
many Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs out of court, thus permitting companies to
not disclose safety issues when investors might want to know about
them regardless of statistical significance. Matrixx’s argument that
129. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 34–36.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting a “bright-line rule”
because materiality is an “inherently fact-specific finding”).
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investors would not consider adverse-event reports to be material
unless they showed a statistically significant increase in the rate of
adverse events might be credible if investors cared only about
whether the drug actually caused the adverse events. Investors,
133
however, care about the market for their shares, which is affected by
many factors, not just whether actual causation exists. Thus, the
materiality determination does not hinge solely on whether evidence
of a causal link between drug use and adverse events is available.
Nevertheless, as alluded to by Justice Scalia in oral argument, it
seems absurd to determine materiality by deciding what information
a reasonable investor thinks would cause unreasonable investors to
134
do with their shares and how this would affect the market. The
inquiry should be whether a reasonable investor would consider the
135
information to “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information.”
In other words, would reasonable investors believe that a smattering
of adverse-event reports is indicative of larger problems within a
pharmaceutical company? The statistical significance standard would
provide investors in pharmaceutical companies with information that
they could know has some substance to it—information that would
provide a meaningful basis for concern about the company’s state of
affairs.
Given the Basic Court’s rejection of relying on a bright-line rule
to determine whether information is material under Rule 10b-5, it
probably will affirm the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of requiring
statistical significance to show materiality. If required, this standard
would bar many plaintiffs from reaching the factual inquiry that is
required for determining materiality. Factors other than the statistical
significance of adverse events are relevant to investment decisions
affecting the market. Thus, adverse-event reports that fail to
demonstrate statistically significant causal links between drug use and
adverse events may be material nevertheless, and corporations might
need to disclose them to shareholders.
Although both sides have strong arguments in their favor,

133. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 091156 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2010) (Chief Justice Roberts noted that if he were an investor in Matrixx, he
would “worry whether [his] stock price is going to go down.”).
134. See id. at 39 (“[I]t seems to me ridiculous to . . . hold companies to . . . irrational
standards.”). But see id. at 16 (“A reasonable investor is going to worry about the fact that
thousands of unreasonable investors are going to dump their Matrixx stock.”) (Roberts, C.J.).
135. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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Siracusano likely will prevail. Whereas Matrixx argues for a clearer
rule that would provide investors with a legitimate basis for concern
136
when information about adverse events is disclosed, Siracusano’s
137
It
rule more clearly adheres to Supreme Court precedent.
encourages pharmaceutical companies to disclose more information
to their investors—information that reasonable investors would
138
consider relevant in their decision-making process.
At oral argument, the Court focused on determining why it should
apply the statistical significance standard and whether factors other
than statistical significance matter, perhaps indicating a preference for
proceeding with a factual inquiry rather than applying a hard-and-fast
rule. The Court also attempted to discern where the boundary
between materiality and nonmateriality would lie in cases involving
adverse-event reports absent a statistical significance standard. This
suggests that the Court may seek to clarify the law without imposing
the strict standard of statistical significance.
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan appeared to dislike the idea of imposing statistical significance
as a matter of law and were skeptical of why the Court should not
permit cases to proceed straight to trial. The Chief Justice emphasized
that the causal link between Zicam and anosmia would not be the
sole issue about which investors would be concerned, and that the
relevant consideration includes how different types of information
139
will affect the market. Questioning why the Court should not just
allow cases such as this to proceed to a factual determination at trial,
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor also implied that information other
than mere statistical data would be important to investors, including
information about who reports the adverse events and the substance
140
of these complaints. Justice Kagan suggested that investors would

136. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 44 (“Statistical significance also gives both
companies and investors guidance they need to understand corporate disclosure obligations. . . .
Statistical significance is a perfectly intelligible basis for distinguishing material from immaterial
[adverse event reports] . . . .”).
137. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 41 (“In Basic, this Court declined to adopt a
‘usable, bright-line rule’ . . . .” (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 232–33)).
138. See id. at 47 (“In assessing the risk of a particular drug causing an important adverse
effect, a reasonable investor would consider a broad range of different kinds of information.”).
139. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 7–8, 16. For example, the Chief Justice
stated that “[y]ou can have some psychic come out and say ‘Zicam is going to cause a disease’
with no support whatsoever, but if it causes the stock to go down [twenty] percent, it seems to
me that’s material.” Id. at 8.
140. See id. at 4 (“But why shouldn’t that determination be deferred until there’s discovery,
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still want to know about adverse events even in situations where the
events are not statistically significant but nonetheless suggest a causal
141
link. Justice Kagan also noted that the FDA looks to other factors
than statistical significance, not requiring adverse-event reports to
demonstrate a statistically significant increase in adverse events
142
before it initiates an investigation or issues warning letters.
Rejecting the statistical significance standard during oral argument,
Justice Breyer suggested that lack of scientific proof does not mean
143
that something is not significant. He explained that many great
scientific theories are relevant and important before they are
144
empirically proven.
Even assuming the statistical significance standard would be the
only issue important to investors, several Justices appeared to reject
the standard for other reasons. Justice Breyer inferred that judges do
not know when adverse-event reports suggest something important
145
about the company, and so should not impose a strict standard.
Congress, Justice Breyer intimated, should institute the statistical
significance standard if it believes that standard adequately reflects
146
when information is material to investors.
Justice Sotomayor
pointed to Matrixx’s apparent concession that the statistical
147
significance standard cannot be absolute in all circumstances.
Appearing to support the statistical significance standard, Justices
Scalia and Alito most likely would side with Matrixx. Justice Scalia
appeared to reject the idea that companies should have to be
concerned with how irrational or unreasonable investors would react
when disclosing information, saying that is not what the Court meant
148
in Basic. Both Justices Scalia and Alito questioned what sort of
affirmative statements a company must make to trigger a duty to
149
disclose the adverse-event reports. Chief Justice Roberts also
expressed some qualms about rejecting the standard and suggested
that pharmaceutical companies would have difficulty keeping

and then we can know how many reports there really were?”) (Ginsburg, J.); id. at 8.
141. Id. at 17–18.
142. Id. at 12–13.
143. Id. at 20–21.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 39.
149. Id. at 48–50.
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unmeritorious suits from going to trial absent the statistical
150
significance standard.
Given Basic’s rejection of a “bright-line rule” when determining
the materiality of information for purposes of securities-disclosure
requirements, the Court probably will hold that Matrixx’s proposed
statistical significance standard is too rigid for the analysis and side
with Siracusano. Many adverse-event reports are made directly to the
pharmaceutical company and might not be known to plaintiffs prior
to discovery, which enables plaintiffs to learn about problems that
might be necessary to establishing a statistically significant
correlation. If the Court required plaintiffs to show statistical
significance as a threshold matter, many litigants would never have
the information necessary to allege the facts required under this
standard.
Additionally, the Court has deferred to the SEC in the past when
interpreting federal securities laws and rules, and the SEC supports
Siracusano’s position here. The Court will likely defer again to the
SEC’s judgment and hold that the materiality of adverse events does
151
not require showing statistical significance. Given his decision in
152
Oran v. Stafford, Justice Alito, along with Justice Scalia, however,
likely will dissent in favor of requiring plaintiffs to show statistical
significance to meet Rule 10b-5’s materiality requirement.
In sum, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano concerns whether
adverse events reported to a drug company constitute material
information that must be disclosed to shareholders under SEA
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Matrixx argues that to be material
information, adverse-event reports must provide statistically
significant evidence of a causal relationship between drug use and
153
adverse events. Siracusano maintains that determining whether
information is material requires a factual inquiry that would be
barred in many cases by the imposition of the statistical significance
154
standard. The First, Second, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal
have applied the statistical significance standard to this materiality
determination, requiring adverse-event reports to demonstrate
statistically significant evidence of a nonrandom link between drug
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 37, 52.
See id. at 51–52.
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 15–16.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
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155

use and adverse events. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
156
rejected this standard. The Supreme Court most likely will resolve
this split by affirming the Ninth Circuit’s holding and rejecting the
statistical significance standard as a departure from the Basic Court’s
emphasis on a comprehensive factual determination.

155. N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen Idec Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 47 (1st Cir.
2008); In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998); Oran, 226 F.3d at
284.
156. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (Matrixx II), 585 F.3d 1167, 1179–80 (9th Cir.
2009).

